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ANTI-SLAPP COVERAGE AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: HURDLES TO DEFAMATION 
SUITS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 
DAVID L. HUDSON, JR.* 
Defamation cases often arise out of intemperate or offensive statements made 
in political campaigns. These comments may refer to a candidate’s criminal 
history, familial conduct, or other matters. Whatever the subject, emotions 
undoubtedly run high during hotly contested campaigns. 
However, First Amendment protection is at its zenith when speakers engage 
in political speech, and speech about political candidates is inherently political 
speech. Thus, defamation suits arising out of political campaigns face 
significant hurdles, including (1) anti-SLAPP statutes and a greater public 
awareness of SLAPP suits; (2) a history and tradition of mudslinging and 
enhanced protection of political speech during political campaigns; and (3) the 
first-amendment-inspired doctrine of rhetorical hyperbole. This Article addresses 
these three obstacles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During the course of a contentious campaign, unflattering social 
media posts trickle in about a political candidate’s past indiscretions, 
familial issues, and complicated political records. The candidate loses 
a narrow election. The candidate then sues for defamation after losing 
an election. She believes that the defamatory comments about her 
were false statements of fact that not only harmed her reputation but 
also cost her the election. 
Such is not a farfetched reality, as political candidates often sue their 
opponents or other individuals for intemperate campaign mudslinging.1 
Much of this speech, as with nearly all other forms of speech, takes place 
in the form of posts on social media, a venue that has become the push 
point for much litigation.2 
But such online defamation lawsuits that arise in the context of political 
campaigns face several significant hurdles. This Essay addresses several 
such hurdles, including (1) greater public awareness of SLAPP suits and 
stronger anti-SLAPP laws; (2) a history of political mudslinging during 
political campaigns and the strong protection of political speech; and 
(3) the defense of rhetorical hyperbole. 
I.    ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES 
In the 1980s, the term “SLAPP” entered the public lexicon as a catchy 
acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation. Coined by 
Professors George Pring and Penelope Canan, the term applied to 
 
 1. David Frum, Tulsi Gabbard Sues for Attention, ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/tulsi-gabbard-sues-
attention/605374; Bryan Schatz, Darrell Issa is Suing His Defeated Opponent for Libel, MOTHER 
JONES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/12/darrell-issa-libel-
lawsuit-doug-applegate [https://perma.cc/7DVA-GM9X]; Riley Snyder, Tarkanian Libel 
Lawsuit Against Jacky Rosen, 2016 Opponent, Blocked by Nevada Supreme Court, NEV. INDEP. (Dec. 
12, 2019, 2:03 PM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/tarkanian-libel-lawsuit-
against-jacky-rosen-2016-opponent-blocked-by-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/92QV-
LLVU]; Brian Whitehead, San Bernardino City Council Candidate Sues Opponent for Defamation, 
Libel, SAN BERNARDINO SUN (Nov. 1, 2018, 3:09 PM), https://www.sbsun.com/ 
2018/11/01/san-bernardino-city-council-candidate-sues-opponent-for-defamation-libel 
[https://perma.cc/ES3Z-6GQR]. 
 2. Cory Batza, Comment, Trending Now: The Role of Defamation Law in Remedying 
Harm from Social Media Backlash, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 429, 433 (2017) (noting that “[v]ictims 
of defamatory statements on social media have increasingly begun suing for 
defamation”); David L. Hudson, Jr., Free Speech or Censorship? Social Media Litigation is a 
Hot Legal Battleground, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2019, 12:05 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
magazine/article/social-clashes-digital-free-speech [https://perma.cc/3JZV-4K5Q]. 
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lawsuits often filed by developers and other large construction companies 
against citizen-activists who objected to alleged environmental abuses.3 
The two University of Denver professors identified the phenomenon as 
part of a “new and very disturbing trend”4—citizens being sued merely for 
exercising their First Amendment rights. 
The plaintiffs in these lawsuits sought to “‘privatize’ public debate” 
through the judiciary.5 The result was that in tens of thousands of cases, 
citizens were “sued into silence.”6 Such lawsuits “chill the right of free 
expression and free access to government, a double-barreled assault 
on the core values of our society.”7 
In other words, SLAPP lawsuits seek to limit public participation. For 
this reason, many anti-SLAPP statutes are called Citizen Public 
Participation Acts.8 These lawsuits often assert such causes of action as 
defamation, malicious prosecution, interference with existing contractual 
relations, abuse of process, or conspiracy to commit these wrongs.9 
A New York judge captured the negative essence of SLAPP suits in 
this colorful description: 
SLAPP suits function by forcing the target into the judicial arena 
where the SLAPP filer foists upon the target the expenses of a 
defense. The longer the litigation can be stretched out, the more 
litigation that can be churned, the greater the expense that is 
inflicted and the closer the SLAPP filer moves to success. The 
purpose of such gamesmanship ranges from simple retribution for 
past activism to discouraging future activism. Needless to say, an 
ultimate disposition in favor of the target often amounts merely to a 
pyrrhic victory. Those who lack the financial resources and 
emotional stamina to play out the “game” face the difficult choice of 
 
 3. GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING 
OUT 3–5 (1996); Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
385, 386–89 (1988). 
 4. George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation” (“SLAPPs”): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT 
L. REV. 937, 938 (1992). 
 5. Id. at 941 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 6. George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 3 (1989). 
 7. Jerome I. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in 
California, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 971 (1999). 
 8. See, e.g., S.B. 1097, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2019) (“This chapter shall be 
known and may be cited as the ‘Tennessee Public Participation Act.’”). 
 9. Pring & Canan, supra note 4, at 947. 
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defaulting despite meritorious defenses or being brought to their knees 
to settle. The ripple effect of such suits in our society is enormous. 
Persons who have been outspoken on issues of public importance 
targeted in such suits or who have witnessed such suits will often choose 
in the future to stay silent. Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat 
to First Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined.10 
Many believed that there needed to be an efficient way for victims of 
SLAPP suits to fight back—or SLAPP back. This led to the creation of 
anti-SLAPP statutes. The idea behind so-called “anti-SLAPP” laws was 
that there should be a procedural mechanism in place to protect 
citizens who have been sued by wealthy corporate actors merely to 
intimidate and silence those citizens for exercising their First 
Amendment freedoms of petition or speech.11 Originally, the statutes 
were designed to provide protection primarily to the citizen-activist 
who opposed the unfriendly environmental activities of a construction 
company or large developer.12 Today, however, SLAPP suits reach a 
much broader range of cases. Scholar Eric Goldman explained, “I 
think about SLAPPS as covering any lawsuit that’s designed to suppress 
socially important speech [such as consumer reviews or investigative 
journalism] . . . there’s a wide range of other kinds of socially 
important content that we want to encourage and foster.”13 
Recognizing the dangers of SLAPP suits on citizen participation, 
beginning in 1989, state legislatures began enacting so-called anti-
SLAPP laws that were designed to provide a procedural mechanism for 
individuals to quickly dismiss meritless lawsuits merely designed to 
silence the defendant’s voice.14 These statutes provide an expedited 
 
 10. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (footnote omitted). 
 11. Matthew D. Bunker & Emily Erickson, #aintturningtheothercheek: Using Anti-
SLAPP Law as a Defense in Social Media, 87 UMKC L. REV. 801, 802 (2019). 
 12. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 3, at 193–94 (explaining the enactment of New 
York’s anti-SLAPP law, which focused narrowly on the relations between companies seeking 
permits for public projects and individuals who comment or report on those public projects). 
 13. Eric Weslander, The First Amendment SLAPPS Back: An Overview of the Free-Speech 
Protections of Kansas’ New Anti-SLAPP Statute, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Jan. 2018, at 30, 33 (quoting 
Congressional Internet Caucus Academy, Frivolous Defamation Suits vs. Online Reviews—
Gagged by the Law(yers)?, YOUTUBE (June 7, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=q0L2efr0rSc [https://perma.cc/9YK4-CAKK] (statements of Eric Goldman)). 
 14. See, e.g., 1989 WASH. SESS. LAWS 1119–20 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. 
CODE § 4.24.510 (2019)) (explaining that a person who acts in good faith when 
reporting a “complaint or information to any agency . . . regarding any matter 
reasonably of concern to that agency shall be immune from civil liability on claims 
based upon the communication to the agency”). 
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procedural process for defendants to rid themselves of frivolous 
litigation.15 This expedited procedure usually includes a stay of 
discovery that forces a court to decide a special motion to dismiss 
within a specific time frame.16 If the defendant is successful in 
SLAPPing back at the SLAPP suit, then these laws generally provide 
that the defendant can obtain attorney fees and costs from the plaintiff 
who filed the lawsuit.17 
While such laws were designed to protect public activists who spoke 
out against large corporate developers or other entities, the concept of 
a SLAPP suit has morphed considerably. Now, the reach of many anti-
SLAPP statutes has expanded to cover freedom of speech, petition, and 
association generally.18 California’s anti-SLAPP statute, for example, 
allows a defendant in a SLAPP suit to file a “special motion to strike” 
the suit if the suit arose from the exercise of a defendant’s “right [to] 
petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue.”19 The 
California law explicitly says that it “shall be construed broadly.”20 
Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute also applies broadly to “free speech in 
connection with public issues,” which is defined broadly as “any written 
or oral statement that is protected under applicable law and is made 
before a governmental entity in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a governmental entity.”21 
Tennessee’s new anti-SLAPP statute, called the Tennessee Public 
Participation Act, is also broad.22 This new law aims to prevent lawsuits 
that are designed to chill individuals’ rights to freedom of association, 
speech, or petition.23 Maryland’s statute ostensibly envisions broad 
coverage, as it applies to protect a person’s right to speak on “any issue 
of public concern.”24 
 
 15. Robert T. Sherwin, Evidence? We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Evidence!: How Ambiguity 
in Some States’ Anti-SLAPP Laws Threatens to De-Fang a Popular and Powerful Weapon 
Against Frivolous Litigation, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 431, 433 (2017). 
 16. Id. at 433, 437. 
 17. Id. at 437. 
 18. Dale W. Felton, Avoid the SLAPP Trap, HOUS. LAW., July/Aug. 2019, at 22, 22. 
 19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2019). 
 20. § 425.16(a). 
 21. FLA. STAT. § 768.295(2)(a) (2019). 
 22. See S.B. 1097, 2019 Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2019). This measure passed the 
Tennessee legislature and was signed by the governor. It went into effect on July 1, 2019. 
 23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-17-103(2)–(4) (2019). 
 24. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807(c) (LexisNexis 2019). 
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In contrast, anti-SLAPP laws in other states are more restrictive. 
Missouri’s anti-SLAPP statute applies to lawsuits against a person “for 
conduct or speech undertaken or made in connection with a public 
hearing or public meeting, in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a 
tribunal or decision-making body of the state or any political subdivision 
of the state.”25 Pennsylvania has an anti-SLAPP statute, called the 
Environmental Immunity Act, which applies only to statements made in 
relation to an environmental issue or regulation.26 Delaware’s anti-SLAPP 
law applies only to acts of “public petition and participation.”27 
The above-cited examples show that anti-SLAPP suits differ 
significantly in terms of wording, process, and coverage. The more 
effective anti-SLAPP suits apply to a broader range of suits. Thus, the 
preferable model is one similar to California or the new Tennessee law, 
which applies more broadly to communications that touch on matters 
of public interest or concern.28 That certainly furthers free-expression 
rights more than some that only protect individuals when they directly 
petition a governmental agency. 
The result has been that defamation suits arising out of political 
campaigns often have been subject to anti-SLAPP statutes—in other 
words, the plaintiffs have been SLAPPed back. Courts have recognized 
that statements made during political campaigns are inherently speech 
on matters of public interest that are most appropriate for application 
of anti-SLAPP statutes.29 Take, for example, the defamation lawsuit 
filed by Nevada casino mogul Sheldon Adelson for negative statements 
made about him during the 2012 Presidential election when he 
contributed substantial amounts of money to Newt Gingrich and Mitt 
 
 25. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528(1) (2019). 
 26. 27 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8301 (2019); see also Pennsbury Village Associates, LLC v. 
McIntyre, 11 A.3d 906, 912 (Pa. 2011) (referring to the Pennsylvania anti-SLAPP 
statute as the Environmental Immunity Act in the first Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
case interpreting the statute). 
 27. 10 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136(a)(1) (2019). 
 28. See supra notes 19–20, 23 and accompanying text (explaining the wide 
application of the California and Tennessee anti-SLAPP statutes). 
 29. Collier v. Harris, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 38–40 (Ct. App. 2015) (“‘The character 
and qualifications of a candidate for public office constitutes a “public issue or public 
interest”’ for purposes of [the anti-SLAPP statute] . . . . [The statute therefore] 
‘applies to suits involving statements made during political campaigns.’” (first quoting 
Vogel v. Felice, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 350, 357 (Ct. App. 2005); and then quoting Conroy v. 
Spitzer 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443, 446 (1999))). 
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Romney.30 According to Adelson, officers of the National Jewish 
Democratic Council posted a statement on their website urging followers 
to pressure then-presidential candidate Mitt Romney to abstain from 
accepting money from Adelson, which, the statement claimed, Adelson 
earned from promoting prostitution in his Chinese casinos.31 Despite these 
statements, the court dismissed Adelson’s suit pursuant to the Nevada anti-
SLAPP law because the speech was clearly political: “the [National Jewish 
Democratic Council’s online statements] were patently partisan statements 
made by a Democratic organization to Democratic-leaning voters in an 
effort to undermine Republican candidates’ financial support.”32 
More recently, Danny Tarkanian, former point guard and son of the 
legendary University of Nevada, Las Vegas basketball coach Jerry 
Tarkanian,33 filed a defamation lawsuit against Jacky Rosen, whom he 
opposed in the United States House of Representatives race in 2016.34 
Tarkanian sued over an ad entitled “Integrity” that Rosen uploaded to 
YouTube and other social media platforms.35 
Tarkanian objected to three statements: “Danny Tarkanian set up 13 
fake charities that preyed on vulnerable seniors”; “seniors lost millions 
from the scams Danny Tarkanian helped set up”; and a statement that 
called Tarkanian’s charities “fronts for telemarketing schemes.”36 After 
Tarkanian filed suit for libel per se, slander per se, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, Rosen responded by filing a motion to 
dismiss under the Nevada anti-SLAPP statute.37 The Nevada Supreme 
Court granted Rosen’s motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, 
noting that the gist of her statements was true, “or at the very least her 
statements were made without actual malice.”38 
 
 30. See Adelson v. Harris, 973 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471–73, 487, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(applying Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute to online statements made about Adelson, 
including that his money was “dirty” and “tainted”), aff’d, 876 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 31. Id. at 471–73. 
 32. Id. at 496. 
 33. Alexander Bolton, Shark, Jr. Hopes to Take ’10 Bite out of Sen. Reid, HILL (Sept. 
10, 2009, 10:05 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/58025-shark-jr-
hopes-to-take-10-bite-out-of-sen-reid [https://perma.cc/V235-BQHY]; see also 
Tarkanian, Danny, OUR CAMPAIGNS, https://www.ourcampaigns.com/Candidate 
Detail.html?CandidateID=44640 [https://perma.cc/J76G-N4PM]. 
 34. Rosen v. Tarkanian, 453 P.3d 1220, 1221–22 (Nev. 2019) (en banc); Snyder, 
supra note 1. 
 35. Rosen, 453 P.3d at 1222. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 1222, 1225–26. 
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A Texas appeals court reached a similar result in a case involving a 
former city councilman who sued a sitting councilperson and others 
for allegedly defamatory statements made on Facebook and other 
venues.39 Frank Fernandez, a former councilman in Kennedale, 
pleaded guilty to the crime of misdemeanor theft for stealing a silver 
bar.40 A sitting member of the council and others made a variety of 
statements about him on Facebook and other places that he claimed 
were untrue, including the statement that he had “committed robbery 
while being a Kennedale city council member.”41 
 The Texas appeals court easily found that the challenged statements 
were statements covered by the Texas anti-SLAPP statute because the 
statements “were made during a political contest.”42 The Texas appeals 
court applied the substantial truth doctrine,43 which calls for courts to 
examine the veracity of the alleged defamatory statements from the 
perspective of “a person of ordinary intelligence,” and granted the 
special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP law.44 
The passage of stronger anti-SLAPP laws has increased the public’s 
consciousness of frivolous lawsuits. It also has led some to question 
whether some of these laws go too far and violate the constitutional 
rights of those who file the lawsuits in the first place.45 
But, an even more pressing reason exists for thoughtful discussion of 
anti-SLAPP lawsuits—the astronomical expansion of speech during the 





 39. Weber v. Fernandez, No. 02-18-00275-CV, 2019 WL 1395796, at *2 (Tex. App. 
Mar. 28, 2019). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at *5–6. 
 43. Id. at *1, *8, *11–13. 
 44. Id. at *20. 
 45. Nick Phillips & Ryan Pumpian, A Constitutional Counterpunch to Georgia’s Anti-
SLAPP Statute, 69 MERCER L. REV. 407, 408 (2018); Mitch Landberg, Anti-SLAPP: A 
Constitutional Tug-of-War, LAW360 (June 25, 2015, 10:47 AM), https://www. 
law360.com/articles/670930/anti-slapp-a-constitutional-tug-of-war (noting that anti-
SLAPP statutes can infringe on the First Amendment right to petition as well as the 
right to trial by jury). 
 46. Lauren Bergelsen, Note, The Need for a Federal Anti-SLAPP Law in Today’s Digital 
Media Climate, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 213, 214 (2019). 
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The expansion of anti-SLAPP to public speech, particularly on the 
Internet, presents a dilemma for policymakers: should they protect 
the rights of petition and free speech from increased threat of 
chilling, or should they protect defamation victims who are at a 
significantly greater risk of harm from online libel? . . . The 
expansion of anti-SLAPP laws into the realm of Internet defamation 
law has upped the ante—the stakes for speakers and those they speak 
about have risen significantly.47 
While the stakes are higher, so are the hurdles for those seeking to 
sue for defamation arising from social media posts about political 
campaigns. Such speech has a hearty tradition and history of societal 
acceptance and First Amendment protection. 
II.    HISTORY OF POLITICAL MUDSLINGING AND THE ENHANCED 
PROTECTION OF POLITICAL SPEECH 
Political campaigns historically have consisted of mudslinging, 
muckraking, name calling, and other less than virtuous behavior.48 The 
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans engaged in virtual warfare 
through the press via pseudonyms, attacking each other’s positions on 
a variety of issues.49 Ultimately, the Federalist Party used a federal law 
known as the Sedition Act of 1798 to silence and even imprison 
Democratic-Republican opponents.50 The Act “criminalized many 
political speakers who engaged in speech about the proper workings 
of a democratic government.”51 
Through the years, politicians frequently engaged in mean-spirited 
dialogue when referring to their opponents. Incivility—rather than 
civility—ruled the day. A legal commentator more than fifty years ago 
aptly noted that “[c]harges of gross incompetence, disregard of the 
public interest, communist sympathies, and the like usually have filled 
 
 47. Andrew L. Roth, Comment, Upping the Ante: Rethinking Anti-SLAPP Laws in the 
Age of the Internet, 2016 BYU L. REV. 741, 768 (2016). 
 48. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 32–33, 
186–87, 201 (2000) (chronicling the divisive exchanges between Alexander Hamilton and 
Aaron Burr preceding their duel at Weehawken and the tumultuous political events of the 
late 1790s between the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans). 
 49. See id. at 197–99 (portraying the fractious political debates between Federalists 
and Democratic-Republicans in the late 1790s). 
 50. See generally JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION 
LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 131, 247, 251–54 (1956) (discussing prosecutions 
in New England under the Sedition Act, where Democratic-Republican printers were 
indicted and tried for printing and publishing “seditious libel”). 
 51. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:2 (2012). 
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the air; and hints of bribery, embezzlement, and other criminal conduct 
are not infrequent.”52 More recently, another legal commentator stated, 
“Lies in politics and political campaigns are nothing new.”53 
Consider the particularly apt statement from a California appeals court: 
Our political history reeks of unfair, intemperate, scurrilous and 
irresponsible charges against those in or seeking public office. 
Washington was called a murderer, Jefferson a blackguard, a knave and 
insane (“Mad Tom”), Henry Clay a pimp, Andrew Jackson a murderer 
and an adulterer, and Andrew Johnson and Ulysses Grant drunkards. 
Lincoln was called a half-witted usurper, a baboon, a gorilla, a ghoul. 
Theodore Roosevelt was castigated as a traitor to his class, and Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt as a traitor to his country. Dwight D. Eisenhower was 
charged with being a conscious agent of the Communist Conspiracy.54 
During the 1800 election between incumbent John Adams and his 
former vice president Thomas Jefferson, Adams’ supporters falsely 
claimed that if Jefferson won the election, Americans “would see their 
wives and daughters the victims of legal prostitution.”55 In the 1880s, 
President Grover Cleveland was accused of fathering a child out of wedlock 
and had to endure campaign chants of “Ma, Ma, Where’s My Pa?”56 
The reality is that one should expect that statements made during the 
course of a political campaign often will be contentious and unpleasant.57 
Many degenerate into a “reckless disregard for the truth.”58 Another 
commentator emphasizes that political campaigns are riddled with 
negative and false advertising.59 This phenomenon leads to a “diminution 
of the public debate” and thoughtful discourse.60 
 
 52. Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 
875 (1949). 
 53. Catherine J. Ross, Ministry of Truth: Why Law Can’t Stop Prevarications, Bullshit, 
and Straight-Out Lies in Political Campaigns, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 367, 367 (2017). 
 54. Desert Sun Publ’g Co. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (Ct. App. 1979). 
 55. Jason Zenor, A Reckless Disregard for the Truth?: The Constitutional Right to Lie in 
Politics, 38 CAMPBELL L. REV. 41, 44 (2016) (quoting Rick Ungar, The Dirtiest Campaign 
Ever? Not Even Close!, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2012, 7:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/rickungar/2012/08/20/the-dirtiest-presidential-campaign-ever-not-even-close 
[https://perma.cc/U8KP-LT4X]). 
 56. Id. at 44. 
 57. Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244, 1249 (8th Cir. 1989) (“There may be no public 
context more contentious than a political campaign.”). 
 58. Zenor, supra note 55, at 43. 
 59. Lee Goldman, False Campaign Advertising and the “Actual Malice” Standard, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 889, 890 (2008). 
 60. Id. at 895. 
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Robert Bork, then an appeals court judge on the D.C. Circuit, 
explained that libel suits arising out of political campaigns often must 
fail because of the First Amendment. Judge Bork explained in two 
noteworthy passages: 
It arouses concern that a freshening stream of libel actions, which 
often seem as much designed to punish writers and publications as 
to recover damages for real injuries, may threaten the public and 
constitutional interest in free, and frequently rough, discussion. 
Those who step into areas of public dispute, who choose the 
pleasures and distractions of controversy, must be willing to bear 
criticism, disparagement, and even wounding assessments. Perhaps 
it would be better if disputation were conducted in measured 
phrases and calibrated assessments, and with strict avoidance of the 
ad hominem; better, that is, if the opinion and editorial pages of the 
public press were modeled on The Federalist Papers. But that is not 
the world in which we live, ever have lived, or are ever likely to know, 
and the law of the first amendment must not try to make public 
dispute safe and comfortable for all the participants. That would 
only stifle the debate.61 
Judge Bork continued in his concurring opinion: 
In deciding a case like this, therefore, one of the most important 
considerations is whether the person alleging defamation has in some 
real sense placed himself in an arena where he should expect to be 
jostled and bumped in a way that a private person need not expect. 
Where politics and ideas about politics contend, there is a first 
amendment arena. The individual who deliberately enters that arena 
must expect that the debate will sometimes be rough and personal.62 
Another California appeals court perhaps summed it up best: “In 
America, one who seeks or holds public office may not be thin of skin. 
One planning to engage in politics, American style, should remember 
the words credited to Harry S. Truman[:] ‘If you can’t stand the heat, 
get out of the kitchen.’”63 
The court’s reference to President Truman’s famous phrase 
indicates a mindset by the judiciary that political candidates entering 
the arena should expect to deal with much intemperate, obnoxious, 
and perhaps defamatory expression. But history and tradition are not 
the only reasons why many courts seemingly disfavor defamation suits 
 
 61. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 1002 (emphasis added). 
 63. Desert Sun Publ’g Co. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (Ct. App. 1979). 
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filed by political candidates. The other main reason is the First 
Amendment’s staunch protection of political speech in general. 
The text of the First Amendment draws no textual distinctions based 
on the type of speech, reading only that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”64 However, the reality is otherwise. 
First Amendment jurisprudence accords different levels of protection 
depending upon the type of speech.65 For example, commercial 
speech receives less protection, as does sexual expression.66 
But political speech represents the core type of speech the First 
Amendment was designed to protect.67 The U.S. Supreme Court famously 
declared that there is a “profound national commitment to the principle 
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide 
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”68 Two 
years later, the Court explained: “Whatever differences may exist about 
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal 
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the 
free discussion of governmental affairs.”69 
The reality, as one state supreme court jurist wrote years ago: 
“Political speech involving public officials, especially that made during 






 64. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 65. HUDSON, supra note 51, § 2:5 (“Although the text of the First Amendment 
provides that ‘Congress shall make no law,’ the freedom does not protect all types of 
speech.”). 
 66. Id. § 6:1 (“Commercial speech, or advertising, represents a category of speech that 
receives a reduced level of First Amendment protection.”); id. § 4.1 (“Pornography and 
sexual expression historically have received scant free-speech protection.”). 
 67. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (noting that political speech 
represents the “zenith” of First Amendment protection); Barry P. McDonald, The First 
Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information 
in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 309 (2004) (noting that “protection of 
speech of a political nature lies at the ‘core’ of the First Amendment”). 
 68. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 69. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
 70. Camp v. Yeager, 601 So. 2d 924, 931 (Ala. 1992) (Maddux, J., dissenting). 
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III.    RHETORICAL HYPERBOLE 
One concept that provides significant breathing space to freedom of 
expression is rhetorical hyperbole.71 Rhetorical hyperbole has been 
defined as “‘‘extravagant exaggeration’ ‘employed for rhetorical 
effect.’”72 This concept provides that even heated and emotional 
rhetoric deserves free-speech protection in a free society.73 The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that the use of the term “blackmail” to refer to a 
developer’s negotiating style was rhetorical hyperbole more than an 
imputation of criminal conduct.74 The Court reasoned that “even the 
most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than 
rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered 
[the developer’s] negotiating position extremely unreasonable.”75 
The U.S. Supreme Court also applied the concept to determine that 
a union’s use of the term “scab” was rhetorical hyperbole rather than 
unprotected defamation.76 The Court reasoned that the use of the term 
in a union dispute was an example of “loose, figurative” language rather 
than defamation.77 The Court further explained that the use of the term 
did not imply that the employees were actually committing crimes.78 
In yet another defamation case, the U.S. Supreme Court again 
discussed the doctrine of rhetorical hyperbole. The Court noted that 
“statements that cannot reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts 
about an individual” made in debate over public matters are 
constitutionally protected to “provide[] assurance that public debate will 
not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ 
which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our Nation.”79 
More than twenty years later, scholar Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky 
presciently noted that it is “fair to predict that many of the new Internet 
 
 71. David L. Hudson, Jr., Rhetorical Hyperbole Protects Free Speech, FREEDOM F. INST. 
(Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2018/10/28/rhetorical-
hyperbole-protects-free-speech [https://perma.cc/L9QW-P6L6]. 
 72. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Gill, 6 S.W.3d 19, 30 (Tex. App. 1999) (quoting WEBSTER’S 
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 592, 1011 (1988)). 
 73. Horsley v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 695, 702 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 74. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970). 
 75. Id. at 14. 
 76. Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285–86 (1974). 
 77. Id. at 284. 
 78. Id. at 285. 
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libel cases will involve rhetorical hyperbole.”80 What Lidsky—or most 
people—probably could not have predicted is that the defense would 
protect Donald J. Trump as President of the United States of America 
instead of as a celebrity television star.81 
President Trump certainly has a penchant for engaging in rhetorical 
hyperbole, and the doctrine has proven an effective defense in litigation.82 
For example, a federal district court in California found that President 
Trump’s negative tweets about Stephanie Clifford, a.k.a. Stormy Daniels, 
were rhetorical hyperbole protected by the First Amendment.83 The 
Court reasoned that the Trumpian communications were made in 
response to criticism of the President: “If this Court were to prevent Mr. 
Trump from engaging in this type of ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ against a political 
adversary, it would significantly hamper the office of the President.”84 
Similarly, a Texas appeals court used the doctrine of rhetorical 
hyperbole in a defamation suit that arose during a political campaign 
in Rehak Creative Services, Inc. v. Witt.85 The case involved various posts 
made to the campaign website of Ann L. Witt, who ran unsuccessfully 
for the 2012 Republican primary for House District 133.86 Witt 
challenged incumbent Jim Murphy, who had held the position since 
2006 and previously had been president of a “municipal management 
district” in a part of Houston known as the Westchase District.87 
Before serving, Murphy sought an opinion as to whether he could serve 
both in the legislature and as president of the Westchase District.88 During 
the campaign, Witt accused Murphy of “sidestep[ping]” the Texas 
 
 80. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace, 
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 81. See Patrick Radden Keefe, How Mark Burnett Resurrected Donald Trump as an Icon 
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Constitution by serving in the legislature while receiving payments as a 
consultant to Westchase District through a limited liability company 
that Murphy created and of which he was the sole member.89  
On a campaign website titled “How to Succeed in Government 
Without Really Trying,” Witt essentially accused Murphy of improperly 
lining his own pockets while serving as a politician. One of the posts read: 
STEP 1: Help create a new taxing entity. 
STEP 2: Hire yourself as its top bureaucrat. 
STEP 3: Make $290,000 a year off taxpayers. 
STEP 4: Sidestep that pesky Texas Constitution. 
STEP 5: Get a second government job. 
STEP 6: Reward your supporters with government contracts.90 
Another version of this six-step success process stated that 
“Westchase District has awarded government contracts to the following 
companies, and the CEOs of these companies have contributed more 
than $48,000 in cash and services to Jim’s campaigns for State 
Representative.”91 One of these listed companies was Rehak Creative 
Services, owned by Robert Rehak.92 
Rehak sued Witt for defamation, “business disparagement; tortious 
interference with business relationships and prospective business 
opportunities; intentional infliction of emotional distress; civil 
conspiracy; conversion; and misappropriation.”93 Rehak specifically 
objected to Witt’s websites using the words “rewarding,” “ripping off,” 
and “bilking.”94 He argued that these words juxtaposed the history of 
Rehak Creative’ Services contracts with Westchase District against 
Rehak’s political contributions to Murphy, leading to the false 
impression that Rehak was attempting to “gain[] influence over an 
elected official to obtain work, to steal and cheat taxpayers, and to help 
the elected official break the law.”95 
The trial court granted a motion by Witt to dismiss Rehak’s claims 
under the Texas anti-SLAPP statute.96 The Texas Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling and classified Rehak’s lawsuit as a 
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SLAPP suit.97 A sizeable portion of the analysis of the defamation claim 
focused on the doctrine of rhetorical hyperbole.98 
The appeals court reasoned: “Viewing the challenged statements as 
a whole and in context, we conclude that a person of ordinary 
intelligence would perceive these words as nothing more than 
rhetorical hyperbole.”99 The court explained that, given the 
statement’s tone and context, an “ordinarily intelligent” individual 
would not take the vigorous criticisms “at face value.”100 Finally, the 
appeals court noted that “[t]he ordinary reader would understand that 
Witt’s vigorous criticism targeted the incumbent elected official she 
hoped to unseat in the primary—not Rehak.”101 
Another California appeals court applied the doctrine of rhetorical 
hyperbole to shield a defendant in a case that arose out of a political 
campaign.102 The case involved two candidates for the California 
assembly, James E. Reed and James Gallagher.103 Toward the end of 
the campaign, Gallagher ran a television ad that referred to Reed as an 
“unscrupulous lawyer.”104 The ad read: 
Jim Reed has launched a negative and misleading campaign, but just 
who is Jim Reed? Legal records show that Reed is an unscrupulous 
lawyer who was sued for negligence, fraud and financial elder abuse. 
Reed’s even been ordered to pay back fees he improperly collected 
from an elderly client. His victim said about Reed, ‘He saw a naïve 
widow and took advantage of me, raked me over the coals.’ Jim Reed. 
Not our values.105 
After Reed lost the election, he sued Gallagher for defamation. Reed 
challenged four express and implied statements in the political campaign 
ad: “(1) that legal records show Reed is an ‘unscrupulous lawyer,’ (2) that 
Reed had been ordered to pay back fees he improperly collected from an 
elderly client, (3) that one of the documents in the ad is an order 
directing Reed to repay fees, and (4) that Reed is a ‘crook.’”106 
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Gallagher responded by filing a motion to dismiss under California’s 
anti-SLAPP law.107 The appeals court determined that the 
characterizations of Reed as an “unscrupulous lawyer” and “a crook” are 
classic rhetorical hyperbole, not a provable false statement of fact.108 The 
court also emphasized the context of the political campaign in reaching 
its determination: “Here, the challenged statement was made during the 
heat of a political campaign, a context in which the audience would 
naturally anticipate the use of rhetorical hyperbole.”109 
 The defamation lawsuits against Trump, Witt, and Gallagher all 
arose out of statements made in the heat of a political debate or a 
political campaign. The challenged statements in each of these cases 
used provocative language. All three reviewing courts recognized that 
such provocative language is a form of rhetorical hyperbole. 
These cases all show that the doctrine of rhetorical hyperbole is a 
significant hurdle in online defamation cases arising out of political 
campaigns. In the words of one court “Hyperbole, distortion, invective, 
and tirades are as much a part of American politics as kissing babies.”110 
CONCLUSION 
Online speech that exaggerates, distorts, and paints a less than 
complete picture is a problem. Such speech has become a “vast 
breeding ground for . . . defamation.”111 Defamation law serves a very 
important purpose in protecting persons from reputation harm. In the 
words of Justice Potter Stewart, it “reflects no more than our basic 
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being.”112 In 
the social media age, speech has exploded, including defamation. 
However, the prevalence of anti-SLAPP laws, the judicial protections 
afforded to political speech, and the defense of rhetorical hyperbole 
all make it very difficult to recover for defamation arising out of social 
media posts during political campaigns. 
Many defamation suits arising out of political campaigns will be 
targeted as SLAPP suits. Particularly in those jurisdictions that have 
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broad coverage under their anti-SLAPP statutes, such as California and 
Tennessee, defamation suits face an uphill climb. Second, history and 
tradition demonstrate that political campaigns are a precursor to the 
rough-and-tumble world of a mixed martial arts or no-holds-barred 
type contest. Closely related to history and tradition is the strong First 
Amendment principle that political speech receives the greatest 
amount of protection. Furthermore, the doctrine of rhetorical 
hyperbole will protect much loose, figurative, and exaggerated 
language that often characterizes political campaign speech. 
As one court wrote over two decades ago, “The overwhelming weight 
of authority is that campaign rhetoric is protected speech and, as such, 
recovery by a candidate is highly unusual.”113 Political campaigns often 
produce uncivil, unpleasant and even repugnant dialogue. But, the 
First Amendment often protects such unsavory expression. 
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